This study examined the contribution of perceived control and autonomy to children's self-reported behavior and emotion in the classroom (JV = 246 children ages 8-10 years). Multiple regression analyses revealed unique effects of autonomy over and above the strong effects of perceived control. In addition, both sets of perceptions (and their interaction) were found to distinguish children who were active but emotionally disaffected from those who were active and emotionally positive. Specific predictions were also tested regarding the effects of (a) control attributions to 5 causes and (b) 4 reasons for task involvement that differed in degree of autonomy on children's active (vs. passive) behavior and 4 kinds of emotions: boredom, distress, anger, and positive emotions. Implications of the findings for theories of children's motivation are discussed, as well as for diagnostic strategies to identify children at risk for motivational problems.
causes (Skinner et al, 1988; Skinner, Wellborn, & Connell, 1990) . Referred to as strategy and capacity beliefs, 1 respectively, combinations of these beliefs have proved useful for identifying profiles of perceived control that promote and undermine children's motivation, behavior, and emotion.
For example, in the academic domain, a clear picture emerges (Skinner et al, 1990) . The children most actively engaged in the classroom are those who believe (a) effort is an important cause of school success and failure, and they themselves can exert effort (high effort strategy and capacity beliefs); (b) that although ability is not necessary for success, they themselves are smart (low ability strategy beliefs and high ability capacity beliefs); and (c) that they have access to powerful others and are lucky (high powerful others and luck capacity beliefs). In contrast, children who are most disaffected from school activities believe (a) they are incapable of exerting effort and are not smart (low effort and ability capacity beliefs); (b) that powerful others and luck are needed to succeed, but they themselves cannot influence others and are unlucky (high strategy and low capacity for powerful others and luck); and (c) that they don't know the causes of success and failure in school (high unknown strategy beliefs). Pairs of strategy and capacity beliefs for each of the five causes examined in the academic domain (effort, ability, powerful others, luck, and unknown) are strong predictors of children's behavior and emotion in the classroom. Taken together, profiles of beliefs predicted to promote and undermine children's motivation account for more than 25% of the variance in teacher's ratings of children's engagement and disaffection in the classroom (Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Skinner, 1991; Skinner etal, 1990) . Surprisingly, the empirical success enjoyed by control constructs has had an unintended side effect for the study of motivation. Because perceived control makes such a strong contribution to behavior and emotion, enthusiasm for the search for other influential constructs has been dampened. When the recent history of motivation is told, theories of perceived control dominate the field (Weiner, 1990) . Nevertheless, theorists and researchers in this area realize that sources of motivation are operating that are outside the boundaries of current conceptualizations of perceived control. What maintains behavioral involvement if perceived control falters in the face of challenges or failure? What guides the selection among tasks that are perceived as equally controllable? What initiates behavior when experiences with an activity are too brief to result in reliable estimates of control? Why do some children who are competent approach learning activities with enthusiasm and interest and other competent children approach them with boredom or anxiety?
Autonomy Versus Control
One explanation focuses on children's autonomy, denned as "a sense of being choiceful in one's actions and experiencing oneself as the locus of initiation of those actions" (Connell & Ryan, 1987, p. 5 ; see also DeCharms, 1976; White, 1959) . Before the joint and synergistic effects of perceived control and autonomy can be studied, however, two conceptual questions must be addressed. First, is autonomy different from control? And, second, does autonomy influence children's behavior and emotion?
Consistent with most people who study autonomy, broadly denned, we argue that control and autonomy are conceptually distinct (see DeCharms, 1981 ; also Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Harter, 1981; Nicholls, 1984; Skinner & Connell, 1986) . Control refers to the connection between behaviors and outcomes; it is the extent to which a person feels capable of producing desired and preventing undesired events; the opposite of control is helplessness. Autonomy refers to the connection between volition and action; it is the extent to which a person feels free to show the behaviors of his choice; nonautonomous behaviors include both compliance and defiance, which have in common that they are reactions to others' agendas and not freely chosen.
It is easy to imagine situations of high control and low autonomy. Many would argue that schools are prototypical in this regard. In schools, contingencies are extremely high and consistent. Children understand the actions that lead to success and failure. However, in many classrooms, even successful children are not free to choose their own behaviors or to follow their own interests. Conformity (and hence loss of autonomy) is the behavior required to control desired outcomes. In fact, it is possible to argue that, in general, extremely high behavioral contingencies for desired outcomes make it difficult to exercise autonomy; the pressure created by the very contingencies that provide control decrease the individual's psychological freedom not to engage in the behaviors .
More controversial is the possibility that high autonomy can exist in the absence of control. Some theories, for example, self-determination theory, argue that high competence (and hence control) is a prerequisite for autonomous behavior . If no control is possible, a state of amotivation exists, no matter how much freedom is also present. A counterargument could be made for cases in which individuals are not concerned with the production of outcomes. Even in schools, children can freely and choicefully participate in some activities (such as art or music), with total disregard for the success or failure of the final product.
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Regardless of the position one takes on this issue in general, it is an empirical question about whether the influence of control and the influence of autonomy on behavior and emotion in a specific domain and at a specific age are redundant, additive, or interactive. That question was at the heart of the present study. Before we describe the hypotheses, however, we outline the conceptualization of autonomy used in the study.
Autonomy and Control

Autonomy
One manifestation of autonomy is found in individual's reasons for engaging in activities. A continuum of autonomy can be used to order qualitatively different reasons for involvement (Chandler & Connell, 1987; Connell & Ryan, 1984; Ryan & Connell, 1989) . The least autonomous reasons for initiating behavior are external, or originating totally outside the person, and include such motivators as expectations of rewards, threats, bribes, and punishments. In these cases, people do not feel free to show the behaviors they choose for fear of the consequences. Next along the continuum of autonomy are reasons that, although internalized, retain their evaluative and pressured character. These are called introjected reasons. In this case, an individual is not free to show desired behaviors for fear of what she will think about herself (e.g., that she is a bad person).
The next reasons, referred to as identified reasons, although not purely intrinsic, are more autonomous than external or introjected reasons because they are freely chosen and individually endorsed. Identified reasons include motivators that were originally external but have been internalized into the personal 2 One difficulty in understanding the distinction between autonomy and control is the result of an historical accident in terminology. Because control and autonomy have independent theoretical traditions (DeCharms, 1981) , no attempt has been made to use labels systematically. Both are concerned with the "location" or "locus" of the influence, in one case, the influence on outcomes (locus of control), and in the other, the influence on behavior (locus of causality). And both have tried to distinguish internal from external influences. However, cumulative research has shown that the distinction between internal vs. external is not very useful in either control or autonomy. Many internal causes are not controllable (e.g., ability). And many actions that originate inside the skin are not choiceful or self-determined (e.g., compulsions). To make matters more complicated, researchers discussing the kinds of contexts that undermine autonomy have referred to them as controlling (vs. informational; Ryan, 1982) . To avoid these terminological confusions, we use control only in reference to perceived control and refer to contexts which undermine autonomy as coercive. We do not use locus or internal vs. external to refer to either control or autonomy. Otherwise, we try to use the construct labels in a way consistent with their typical use in the respective areas. value system. In this case, the person engages in the behavior because it is personally important to him or her. Next are integrated reasons that, although not seen in children, refer to flexible, balanced interrelations among multiple, competing identified goals from different domains. Last are intrinsic reasons for involvement in an activity. Purely intrinsic motives focus on involvement in the task for its own sake, with emphasis on the processes and not the outcomes of the activity. They are characterized by enthusiasm, spontaneity, excitement, intense concentration, rapt attention, complete involvement, and joy.
In the academic domain and with children, research has been focused on how children with different reasons for involvement in school activities, such as studying for tests or completing homework, also show different patterns of classroom engagement and performance. For less autonomous children, performances are marked by fear, tension, pressure, defensive strategies, and attempts to evade the activity. In contrast, for more autonomous children, performance in the face of obstacles is characterized by exertion, persistence, strategy testing, and optimism (Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Nicholls, 1984) .
This perspective provides a basis for predictions about autonomy as a powerful motivator of performance and affect, independent of perceived control (Connell & Ryan, 1984; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Skinner & Connell, 1986) . It elaborates multiple reasons for regulating behavior and postulates that they differentially influence motivation because of the extent to which they differ on autonomy. Taken together with theories of perceived control, this perspective was used to derive the following predictions about the joint effects of control and autonomy on children's behavior and emotion during learning activities.
Hypotheses About Control and Autonomy
Behavior. Both perceived control and autonomy have been shown to predict to exertion, attention, persistence in the face of difficulties, and sustained involvement in learning activities (Abramson et al., 1978; Bandura, 1986; Connell & Ryan, 1984; Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Weiner, 1985) . Hence, we predicted that both perceived control and autonomy would show individual relations to children's behavioral engagement in the classroom. We did predict, however, that perceived control would show a stronger relation to behavior than autonomy. We reasoned that, although higher control and more autonomy would both predict to more active behavior, the effects of low control and low autonomy would differ. Children who have low perceived control would not even try, and as a result, effortful behavior would be totally absent (which Deci & Ryan, 1985, described as amotivation; Skinner, Wellborn, & Connell, 1990) . In contrast, children with low perceived autonomy might nevertheless show minimal behavioral compliance (e.g., because they are motivated by external reasons, such as fear of punishment).
We also tested two new hypotheses. First, we expected that perceived control and autonomy, representing separate sources of motivation, would contribute uniquely to motivated behavior. Although it might be expected that perceived control, as a major predictor of effortful performance, would overshadow autonomy, we predicted that, even given the large portion of the variance in behavior for which perceived control can account, autonomy would account for additional unique variance (Connell & Ryan, 1984; Skinner & Connell, 1986) . Second, we predicted an interaction between perceived control and autonomy, such that the highest levels of behavioral involvement would be shown by children with high perceived control and high autonomy (Connell & Wellborn, 1991) .
Emotion. As with behavior, we predicted that both control and autonomy would make unique and interactive contributions to children's emotion during learning activities. However, more differentiated predictions were also made about four kinds of emotions that children experience during learning activities: positive emotions (interested, happy, and relaxed), boredom, distress, and anger.
3 As predictors, we considered attributions to five causes (effort, ability, powerful others, luck, and unknown causes) and four reasons reported by children (external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic). First, we hypothesized that children who are more intrinsically motivated and rely more on effort would express more positive emotions in learning situations. These two kinds of motivation have been shown to have the most beneficial effects on emotion. Second, children who were bored were expected to be very low in intrinsic motivation. This link was expected to be especially strong, because interest is the hallmark of intrinsic motivation. Third, children who feel distressed would believe that they lack the ability that is necessary for success. Loss of control due to internal, stable, and global causes is considered a risk factor for sadness or depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Nolen-Hoeksma, Girgus, & Seligman, 1986) . Fourth, children who are more distressed when involved in learning tasks would be more introjected in their reasons; anxiety would stem from the pressures such children exert on themselves. In addition, distressed children would think that school performance is dependent on luck or unknown factors; in this case, anxiety would result from the uncertainty connected with these causes. Finally, we predicted that anger would be the result of external reasons for task involvement and the conviction that powerful others are needed for school success. We expected that external reasons would be an especially strong predictor of anger; anger and resentment would be the result of being pressured by others.
Behavior and emotion. In general, behavior and emotion are positively correlated. When one feels anxious or sad, one withdraws from the situation; when one is interested, one tries harder. However, we were concerned about children for whom behavior and emotion become uncoupled, specifically, those children who continue to show behavioral involvement even when they are emotionally disaffected. These children are of special interest because they are not likely to receive the help they need. Anxious or bored children are not typical targets of interventions as long as they continue to show behavioral involvement in classroom activities.
We reasoned that perceived control was not likely to be very informative about these children. Perceived control operates the same way on behavior and emotion: High perceived control leads to high involvement and enthusiastic emotions; when control is low, children feel bad and stop working. We thought that autonomy might be the key to understanding children for whom behavioral activity continues even when emotional energy is gone. Children who are feeling bored or anxious may nevertheless maintain behaviors if they are being externally or internally pressured.
Hence, we formulated two hypotheses about combinations of behavior and emotion. First, we predicted that, because lack of control is effective in stopping behavior, the primary difference between children who are unhappy and passive (low emotion and low behavior) and those who are unhappy but active (low emotion and high behavior) would be their perceived control. Second, because low autonomy can maintain behavior even in the absence of enthusiasm, we expected that the primary difference between children who are unhappy but active (high emotion and high behavior) and those who are active and happy (high behavior and high emotion) would be their autonomy.
Method
Sample and Procedures
Participants were 264 children from two elementary schools in a suburban and rural district in upper New York state. Children were equally divided by sex and grade from Grades 3,4, and 5 (M age = 8.3 years, SD = .45 years). The school district was middle to lower middle class with a small minority population. Children completed the assessments used for this study as part of a larger research project. Assessments were conducted in three 45-min sessions in the classroom by two trained administrators without the teacher present. Children answered questions at their seats while one administrator read the questions aloud and one circulated in the classroom to answer any questions and to make sure that children were keeping up.
Measures
Three assessments were used for this study: perceived control, autonomy, and engagement in the classroom. All items were answered on a 4-point scale from not at all true for me (1) to very true for me (4). All scores were calculated by averaging the items for the respective scale and so could range from ! to 4.
Perceived control. The Student Perceptions of Control Questionnaire (SPOCQ, Wellborn, Connell, & Skinner, 1989; Skinner et al., 1988) was used to tap children's strategy and capacity beliefs for five causes: effort, ability, powerful others, luck, and unknown causes. All scales consisted of six items, equally divided into success and failure. The strategy beliefs scales tapped children's beliefs about the extent to which each cause is a necessary condition for producing success and preventing failure in school (e.g., effort: "If 1 want to do well on my schoolwork, I just need to try hard" and ability: "If I'm not smart, I won't get good grades"). For the five strategy belief scales, internal consistencies ranged from .65 to .82, M a = .73. The corresponding capacity beliefs scales tapped children's beliefs about the extent to which they possessed or had access to the four known causes (e.g., effort: "I can't seem to try very hard in school" and ability: "When it comes to school, I'm pretty smart"). For the four capacity belief scales, «s = .59-.79, Ma = .70.
For purposes of this study. Strategy X Capacity Beliefs interaction scores for each of the four known causes were constructed. For effort and ability interaction scores, a high score indicates an attribution of success to that cause and a low score an attribution of failure. Interaction scores for ability were calculated by multiplying the additive inverse of strategy beliefs by capacity beliefs (i.e., low strategy and high capacity beliefs: "Ability is not essential but I'm smart"). For effort, the interaction score was calculated for success by multiplying strategy by capacity beliefs and for failure by multiplying strategy beliefs by the additive inverse of capacity beliefs, and then these two effort scores were subtracted from each other. Hence, high scores indicated high effort strategy and capacity beliefs ("Effort is important and I can try hard"), whereas low scores indicated high effort strategy and low effort capacity beliefs ("Effort is important but I am unable to try hard"). Finally, for powerful others and luck, a high score indicates an attribution of failure to that cause and a low score indicates an attribution of success. Interaction scores for powerful others and luck were calculated by multiplying strategy beliefs by the additive inverse of capacity beliefs (i.e., high strategy and low capacity beliefs: "Luck is an important cause and I'm unlucky").
In addition, a maximum control score (ConMax) was calculated by combining profiles of beliefs. Higher scores on this profile indicate high strategy beliefs for effort, and low strategy beliefs for ability, as well as high capacity beliefs for all four causes. Low scores on this profile indicate high strategy beliefs for powerful others, luck, and unknown as well as low capacity beliefs for all four causes (Skinner et al., 1990) . In sum, six perceived control scores were used in this study: interaction scores for effort, ability, powerful others, and luck; unknown strategy beliefs; and maximum control.
Autonomy. Children's perceived autonomy was assessed using the Self-Regulatory Style Questionnaire (SRQ, Connell & Ryan, 1984; Ryan & Connell, 1989) . The SRQ consists of four scales that differ on the extent to which reasons for task involvement are autonomous. Children rate each set of items as answers to questions about why they perform school activities (e.g., "Why do 1 do my homework?"). The six-item External scale (a = .78) taps reasons outside the child that imply pressure from external sources (e.g., "because I'll get in trouble if I don't"). The five-item Introject scale (a = .75) taps reasons that are internalized but directly incorporated from external reasons and so are still pressured (e.g., "because I'll feel bad about myself if I don't do it"). The four-item Identified scale (a = .61) taps reasons that are internalized into the value system of the child and so are choiceful and unpressured (e.g., "because I want to learn new things"). The six-item Intrinsic scale (a = .85) taps reasons of pure fun and enjoyment (e.g., "because it's fun").
These four scales have been shown to be factorially distinct and valid as indicatorsof the amount of autonomy with which school activities are carried out (Ryan & Connell, 1989) . A summary score, referred to as the Relative Autonomy Index (RAI) was also calculated in which the four scales were weighted according to their autonomy (-3, -1, +1, and +3, for external, introject, identified, and intrinsic, respectively) and summed. Hence, five autonomy scores were used in the study: external, introjected, identified, intrinsic self-regulation (higher scores on which indicated more of the respective reasons), and the RAI, higher scores on which indicated more autonomy in initiating learning activities.
Behavior and emotion. Children's motivated behavior in the classroom was assessed using an 18-item self-report scale (a = .87), which tapped children's effort, persistence, attention, and participation during the initiation and completion of learning activities (Wellborn, 1991; Wellborn & Connell, 1987) . The scale was equally weighted by positive and negative items (e.g., "The first time my teacher talks about a new topic, I listen carefully"; "When I'm in class, I just act like I'm working"). These items were factorially distinct from the emotion items. Children's reports of their behavior in the classroom have been found to be significantly related to teachers' reports of these same behaviors (Skinner & Belmont, in press ). Hence, we treated these self-reports as indicators of children's actual behavioral involvement in class.
The scores used to reflect children's emotions in the classroom were the result of exploratory factor analyses on a set of items designed to tap a range of emotions experienced during the initiation and completion of learning activities. Children rated 35 items for the extent to which they corresponded to emotions they felt in school. Three stems were used ("When we start something new in class, I feel. . ."; "When I'm working in class, I feel . . ."; and "When I'm in class I feel . . ."). Twenty negative emotion words were used to tap five dimensions: bored (e.g., tired, bored, and sleepy), worried (e.g., scared, nervous, and worried), sad (e.g., sad and unhappy), bad (e.g., bad and terrible), and angry (e.g., mad and angry). Sixteen positive emotions were used to represent the polar opposites of four of the negative dimensions: interested (e.g., interested and involved), relaxed (e.g., relaxed and comfortable), and happy (e.g., happy and glad).
After removing items on the basis of psychometric criteria, such as low internal consistencies or lack of correlation with synonyms, we entered the remaining 20 items (12 negative and 8 positive) in an exploratory factor analysis using oblique (Promax) rotation. We expected four factors (three of which would be bipolar positive-negative) corresponding to the four dimensions used to generate items. The actual factor pattern differed from that expected in two major ways. First, little differentiation of the positive items was found; in general, positive items all loaded on a single factor and did not load on the same factors as their designated negative items. When separate factor analyses were subsequently performed on the positive and negative items alone, the positive items were accounted for by a single factor (a = .88). Second, for the negative items, three instead of four factors emerged: bored, worried-sad, and angry. As a result, three negative emotion scores were used: bored (4 items, a = .76), distress (worried-sad, 6 items, a = .75), and angry (2 items, interitem correlation = .77). In sum, for behavior and emotion indicators, the following scores were used: motivated behavior; positive emotion; bored, distressed, and angry emotions; and total emotion (average of positive and negative emotion scores).
Results
Data analyses were designed to answer three questions: (a) Does autonomy contribute uniquely to the primary dependent variables, behavior and emotion, over and above the contribution of perceived control? (b) How do specific attributions and reasons relate to specific emotions? and (c) Do perceived control and autonomy differentially characterize children with different motivational profiles, or combinations of behavior (active or passive) and emotion (positive or negative)? As a context for interpreting the analyses that address these questions, we present information regarding mean levels and intraconstruct and interconstruct correlations. 
Initial Analyses
Descriptive statistics. Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for both the overall composite variables and the subcomponents of behavior, emotion, autonomy, and perceived control. The range of variance, as indicated by the standard deviations, was satisfactory, revealing comparable variability across constructs. For one subscale, the mean fell within one standard deviation of the maximum possible value: the identified subscale of autonomy. Given the indication of potential ceiling effects, correlations involving this variable might be attenuated.
Intraconstruct correlations. The correlations among subscales that make up each construct are presented in Table 2 . For emotion, the positive subscale was highly negatively correlated with boredom. The three negative emotion subscales (boredom, distress, and anger) were moderately intercorrelated (range = .32-47). The interdependence among the subscales for the dependent variables might make it difficult to find support for the differentiated predictions.
The four subscales of the autonomy measure were intercorrelated with each other in the simplex pattern of ordered correlations reported by Ryan and Connell (1989) . Because these subscales are ordered according to a continuum of autonomy (from external to introjected to identified to intrinsic), Ryan and Connell (1989) hypothesized and subsequently demonstrated that subscales that are closer to each other on this continuum are more highly correlated. Our data differed from this simplex pattern primarily in the correlations involving identified reasons: between the introjected and identified subscales (r = .09 for our data vs. r = .47, averaged across four samples for Ryan & and between the identified and intrinsic subscales (r = .62 for our data vs. r = .46, from Ryan & Connell, 1989) . Both the lower identified-introjected correlation and the higher identified-intrinsic correlation can be explained by the slightly different flavor of the identified items used in the current study, which included items such as "Why do I try to do well in school? Because I enjoy doing schoolwork well" (Wellborn & Connell, 1987) . Including words like enjoy, in effect, increased the conceptual similarity of this subscale to the intrinsic subscale, while decreasing the similarity to the introjected subscale. The five control subscales (effort, ability, powerful others, and luck strategy by capacity beliefs and unknown strategy beliefs) were moderately intercorrelated. Correlations ranged from .35 (powerful others and unknown) to -.62 (effort and luck). The interdependence among the subscales again highlighted the importance of examining the unique effects of these independent variables on behavior and emotion in subsequent analyses.
Interconstruct correlations. Tables 3, 4 , and 5 contain the zero-order correlations between constructs, first for the composite variables and then separately by subscale. The behavior and emotion constructs were closely interrelated (see Table 3 ), indicating about 50% shared variance between the two primary dependent variables. Especially interesting was the degree of interrelatedness between the two independent variables, autonomy (RAI) and perceived control (ConMax). As can be seen, this relationship was of a somewhat lesser but still considerable magnitude, again raising the issue of the unique predictive value of these independent variables. Later analyses explored this issue in depth. The pattern of correlations suggested that the perceived control composite was more closely related to both behavior and emotion than was the autonomy composite. Although the RAI was significantly related to both (Mr-.55), the zero-order correlations of ConMax to the dependent variables were somewhat higher (M r = .68).
Unique Effects of Perceived Control and Autonomy on Behavior and Emotion
To determine the unique effects of both perceived control and autonomy on the dependent variable composites, we performed two regression analyses using ConMax, RAI, and their interaction as independent variables and emotion and behavior separately as dependent measures. The overall equations were significant (for behavior, adjusted R 2 = .51; for emotion, adjusted R 2 = .50, both ps < .0001). As expected, perceived control, controlling for autonomy, contributed uniquely to both behavior (0 = .56, p < .001) and emotion {0 = .53, p < .001). More interestingly, autonomy also contributed uniquely to both behavior (0 = .25, p < .001) and emotion (0 = .27, p < .001), even controlling for perceived control. Neither interaction reached significance. Given the high zero-order correlations between perceived control and the dependent variables, it was noteworthy that autonomy accounted for variance above and beyond that of perceived control.
The next two sets of regressions examined the pattern of unique relations between the subscales of each set of perceptions and behavior and emotion. When the five component subscales of control (effort, ability, powerful others, luck, and unknown) were simultaneously regressed onto behavior, two attributions accounted for unique variance in behavior: effort (0 = .49, p < .001) and powerful others (<8 = -.19, p < .001). When emotion was regressed on the five attributions, all but ability contributed uniquely to the equation (effort, 0 = .28, p < .001; powerful others, 0= -.14, p< .02; luck, 0 = -.20, p < .005; and unknown, 0 = -.16, p < .005). The corresponding analyses, in which the four components of autonomy were regressed on behavior and emotion, revealed that all the reasons other than introjected uniquely predicted behavior (external, 0 = -.21, p < .001; identified, 0 = .48, p < .001; intrinsic, 0= A3, p < .05); and emotion was uniquely predicted by all four subscales (external, 0 = -.15, p < .02; introjected, 0 = -.23, p < .001; identified, 0 = .35, p < .001; and intrinsic, 0 = .19, p < .005). Note. N = 264 children, Grades 3-5. RAI = Relative Autonomy Index; ConMax = maximum control profile. Coefficients greater than .21 are significant at the .001 level; greater than .16 at the .01 level; greater than . 13 at the .05 level.
Next, to examine the unique contributions of all the components of both control and autonomy, we put the five attributions and the four autonomy subscales together into one analysis and regressed behavior onto the full set of nine independent variables (see Figure 1) . As can be seen, the strongest unique predictors of behavior were effort attributions and identified reasons; powerful others and unknown also contributed uniquely to behavior. When emotion was subsequently regressed onto the nine subscales, identified reasons emerged as the strongest unique predictor; other unique predictors of emotion included effort, powerful others, luck, and unknown attributions, and introjected and intrinsic reasons (see Figure 1) .
The number of unique predictors of emotion was striking (everything except ability attributions and external reasons). However, the fact that the emotion composite included a welldifferentiated set of subcomponents (positive emotions, boredom, distress, and anger) rather than a more general measure of overall emotional tone, may account for this finding. Specific attributions and reasons may relate to specific subcomponents of emotion. To test this explanation, we ran a set of analyses in which each emotion subcomponent was considered separately as a dependent variable and regressed onto all nine subscales of perceived control and autonomy simultaneously (Figure 2 ). Positive emotion was uniquely predicted only by effort attributions and by the more self-determined reasons, identified and intrinsic. Anger was predicted by luck attributions and introjected Note. N= 264 children, Grades 3-5. Coefficients greater than .21 are significant at the .001 level; greater than .16 at the .01 level; greater than .13 at the .05 level. RAI = Relative Autonomy Index; ConMax = maximum control profile. Figure I . Unique relationships between perceived control and autonomy subcomponents (independent variables) and behavior and emotion composites (dependent variables). (Coefficients are standardized regression coefficients. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.)
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reasons, whereas distress was a function of both luck and unknown attributions as well as of introjected reasons. Boredom was predicted by unknown attributions and by both external and lack of intrinsic reasons.
Motivational Profiles
Our specific predictions were that (a) children who were passive and emotionally disaffected (low behavior and emotion) would be distinguished from children who were active and emotionally disaffected (low behavior and high emotion) on the basis of their perceived control and (b) children who were active and emotionally disaffected (high behavior and low emotion) would be distinguished from children who were active and emotionally engaged (high behavior and emotion) on the basis of their autonomy. To test these hypotheses, we constructed two new dependent variables, one for each hypothesis, to reflect interactions between behavior and emotion. First, we identified students with extreme high or low values for behavior and emotion, using selection criteria that were designed to produce at least 20 children per group. First, we coded as 0 those students (« = 46) with low behavior (less than 3.0 on a 4-point scale, M= 2.55) and low emotion (less that 2.8 on a 4-point scale, M = 2.35), and we coded as 1 those children (« = 23) with high behavior (greater than 3.0 on a 4-point scale, M = 3.28) but low emotion (less than 2.8 on a 4-point scale, M = 2.35).
We then regressed this new variable simultaneously onto perceived control and autonomy to determine whether they would uniquely predict group membership. Perceived control distinguished between the two groups (P = .30, p < .05), indicating that, controlling for autonomy, children with high behavior and low emotion had higher perceived control than children with low behavior and emotion. Autonomy, controlling for perceived control, did not distinguish the groups. These results suggest that, given a relatively unhappy student, increases in behavior will result from increases in control but not autonomy.
To test the second prediction, we contrasted two groups: the high behavior and low emotion group described above were coded as 0; coded as 1 were students (n = 54) with high behavior (greater than 3.0 on a 4-point scale, M= 3.77) and high emotion (greater than 3.6 on a 4-point scale, M = 3.76). When we regressed this variable simultaneously onto ConMax and RAI, we found that both RAI and ConMax were strong unique predictors (RAI p = .48; ConMax p = .40, both ps < .0001). In other words, for students already high in behavioral engagement, both autonomy and perceived control predicted to better emotional outcomes.
Discussion
Strong empirical support was found for the proposition that two distinct sources of motivation contribute uniquely to children's behavior and emotion during classroom learning activities. Despite the powerful effects of perceived control on children's motivation, autonomy was able to account for additional unique variance. Although the hypothesized interactions between control and autonomy were not found in predicting behavior and emotion, the pattern of regressions indicated that the effects of autonomy were not redundant with the effects of control, despite the large overlap between the two sets of perceptions. Instead, autonomy augmented the total amount of variance in motivation already accounted for by control.
Clear patterns emerged depicting the combinations of control and autonomy that predict to behavior and specific emotions. Most behavioralfy active are children who believe in the efficacy of effort and whose reasons for task involvement are identified. The expression of positive emotional engagement is a function of the two more autonomous reasons for engaging in learning activities (identified and intrinsic) and, to a lesser extent, of effort beliefs. Optimal motivation, then, characterized by active behavioral involvement, interest, enthusiasm, and happiness, is the result of both perceived control centered on the effectiveness of effort and reasons for engagement that are autonomous. At the same time that both control and autonomy are unique predictors of children's feelings in the classroom, the precise aspects of beliefs that contribute to specific emotions are distinguishable. Although distress and anger form separate dimensions in the factor analysis, their predictors are similar. Both worried and angry children's beliefs about control rely on luck even though they see themselves as unlucky, and their reasons for task involvement are pressured internally (introjected); in addition, they don't believe they know the strategies to produce success and avoid failure in school. Finally, children who are bored also report more external as well as fewer intrinsic reasons for engagement, and their control beliefs are organized around unknown strategies.
The link between external reasons and boredom makes clear that lack of intrinsic motivation (also a predictor of boredom) does not imply the absence of reasons for task involvement. Instead, when intrinsic motivation is missing, children can motivate themselves using several qualitatively different styles. And the one that leads to boredom are reasons that are external, that is, are based on expectations of rewards or fear of punishments from others. In addition, the links between introjection and both distress and anger point out the dual nature of pressured, introjected reasons. On the one hand, the regulation of behavior is internalized, and so internal pressure to act in certain ways is maintained, resulting in distress. At the same time, however, because regulation of behavior is not integrated, this style retains the evaluative character of being pressured by others, resulting in anger.
Finally, both control and autonomy are predictors of motivational profiles, or patterns of behavior and emotion. Of special interest are children who are behaviorally active but emotionally disaffected. These children differ from completely disaffected children (low behavior and low emotion) only in terms of their perceived control. In other words, children who feel that they have no control are passive, no matter what their reasons for engagement . However, children who are active but emotionally disaffected differ from fully engaged children (high behavior and emotion) on both autonomy and control. For children who are already behaviorally active, more positive emotions are the result of both higher perceived control and reasons for engagement that are more autonomous.
Limitations of the Present Study
The implications of these findings for theory and research on motivation should be discussed in the context of the study's strengths and limitations. One strength is the measures of perceived control and autonomy. First, equally valid and reliable indicators were used, and so any differences in the relative predictive power of the constructs cannot be due to differentially sensitive instruments. Second, the assessments of perceived control and autonomy are differentiated, allowing conclusions not only about the general importance of the two sets of perceptions, but also about the unique predictions from multiple aspects of each. It is interesting to note, for example, that the aspects of perceived control that predict to positive emotions (i.e., effort beliefs) are not the same ones that predict to distress (i.e., luck and unknown).
The major limitation of the study centers on the assessments of behavior and emotion. On the one hand, it would have been helpful to have an additional measure of student active behavioral engagement. Although both perceptions and emotions are internal phenomena and most validly assessed through self-reports, children's behavioral engagement could also have been reported by teachers and observers. Some evidence does indicate that student and teacher reporters converge in their assessments of behavior. For example, a study that compared teacherand self-reports of student behavior for children of the same ages as in this study found them to be significantly correlated (Skinner & Belmont, in press ). In addition, studies of the effects of perceived control on teacher ratings of behavior and emotion reveal the same pattern of findings as the present study (Skinner et al., 1990) . Nevertheless, it would be important to replicate the current pattern of relationships using other assessments of children's behavior.
The assessment of emotion, although reliable and valid, did not tap as many dimensions of emotion as intended or certainly as possible. Assessment of additional emotions might also broaden the picture; ones suggested by other theories would include pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment (Covington, 1984; Weiner, 1979 Weiner, , 1985 . These emotions may also be more appropriate for students at slightly older ages than the third to fifth graders in the present study.
Implications for Intervention
The study leads to firm recommendations for remediation of emotional disaffection in the classroom (Connell & Ryan, 1984; Ryan, Connell, & Deci, 1985) . Most motivational interventions focus on structure, broadly defined, including increasing children's success experiences, increasing the contingency between children's behavior and important outcomes, and making sure that children have the strategies they need to produce success and avoid failure. Although these interventions may be effective in increasing children's perceived control, they will, at best, be ineffectual in facilitating their autonomy. And at worst, they may make children feel even more evaluated and pressured by the relentless focus on success and outcomes. To facilitate autonomy, children need contextual support for autonomy (Connell & Ryan, 1984; . Autonomy support, a dimension that is orthogonal to structure, includes provision of choice, lack of coercion, respect for children's own agendas, and learning activities relevant to children's own goals. The current conceptualization makes very clear that only in contexts that support autonomy can children be fully engaged in learning tasks.
When it is not feasible to measure perceived control and autonomy directly, this research can also be used as a guide to "diagnosing" motivational problems directly from children's patterns of behavior and emotion. For example, teachers can test the idea that children who are behaviorally active but bored have less intrinsic and more external reasons and so may need autonomy support in the form of more intrinsically interesting and relevant activities to facilitate more identified and intrinsic reasons. On the other hand, teachers might expect children who are passive and anxious to be relying on luck and unknown strategies, and so may provide more structure (perhaps in the form of more effective strategies) to improve motivation.
And of course, the current study suggests that any scheme for evaluating the effectiveness of a program to improve motivation should not focus solely on behavior as is typically the case, but should also include the assessment of emotion and multiple aspects of control and autonomy. As has been seen, it would be possible to improve behavioral engagement at the cost of autonomy. In fact, many programs that seek to improve motivation through such strategies as competition or "raising the level of concern" (Hunter, 1982) are almost certainly making such a sacrifice.
Conclusions
An important implication of the current research is that other sources of motivation, in addition to perceived control, influence children's behavioral and emotional engagement in the classroom. Although no one would seriously argue that perceived control is the single predictor of motivation, the study of other sources has not only been slowed by the empirical success of perceived control, but has also tended to be conducted in relative isolation from research on perceived control.
The search for complementary or even synergistic predictors of behavior and emotion may lead to broader, more integrative, theories of motivation. For example, one theoretical model suggests that three sources of motivation exist, based on three innate psychological needs (Connell, 1991; Connell & Wellborn, 1991; . The three needs suggested by this model are competence, autonomy, and relatedness. This theory could explain why perceived control and autonomy are independent sources of engagement and would also suggest that a third independent source could be studied: the belief systems associated with people's needs to be connected with and loved by others (Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Weiner, 1990, "belongingness") . Already, research conducted in the attachment tradition has shown that internal working models of attachment figures predict to exploratory behavior and emotional reactions to stress (Ainsworth, 1979) . Whatever the source, however, it would be important to examine the effectiveness of the new construct in predicting to both behavior and emotion, to examine its effects in interaction with other sources of motivation, and to test its power in distinguishing among children with different motivational profiles. Such a systematic approach may be one route for increasing our understanding of the dynamics of motivation.
